In a significant blow to Australia’s defence capabilities, the federal government is cancelling what would have been the nation’s largest-ever space project: a A$7 billion military satellite communications system.
Author
- David Tuffley
Senior Lecturer in Applied Ethics & CyberSecurity, Griffith University
The decision . It comes just 18 months after the Albanese government gave the green light to the ambitious program.
Defence industry sources indicated that insufficient funding was allocated to start the program, despite its strategic importance. , “defence industry figures believe there are cheaper options available”.
The project’s cancellation would mark a dramatic reversal for a program that was meant to make Australia’s military communications safer at a time when the cyber threat landscape has been steadily evolving.
The rise and fall of JP9102
The ambitious satellite program is known as . It was awarded to in April 2023 after a competitive tender process that included major players like Airbus, Northrop Grumman and Optus.
The project several . It would also involve several ground stations, new satellite communications operations centres, and a central management system. Taken together, this would create a secure communications network for Australia’s military.
Currently, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) uses a complex network of up to 89 different “capabilities” (military assets) that rely on satellite communications.
This existing system lacks the comprehensive security and coverage that JP9102 promised to deliver. Without it, Australia’s military communications are potentially left vulnerable to cyber and electronic warfare attacks.
In its statement, the Department of Defence claims its “current satellite communications capabilities support the immediate needs of the organisation”.
What can military satellites deliver?
The proposed satellite system was intended to create “uncrackable data network” across the ADF.
These military-grade satellites would have provided secure communications for fighter jets, naval vessels and ground forces across the vast Indo-Pacific region.
Unlike commercial satellites, military satellites incorporate advanced encryption and anti-jamming capabilities. This makes them significantly more resistant to cyber attack and electronic warfare.
Military satellites face sophisticated from both state and non-state actors.
China and Russia are widely recognised as having advanced capabilities in this domain. They have the ability to jam satellite signals, intercept communications and potentially even take control of satellite systems. North Korea has also demonstrated growing capabilities in cyber warfare, particularly in signal jamming.
In 2014, forces reportedly jammed and disrupted satellite communications during their operations in Crimea. More recently, at the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, hackers disabled thousands of satellite modems that were part of the Viasat satellite network, causing disruptions to both military and civilian communications across Europe.
In the commercial sector, Iran has been of jamming satellite broadcasts and GPS signals.
This demonstrates how even nations with less advanced military capabilities can pose significant threats to satellite communications.
a “bleeding-edge technology project”. It included plans for machine learning capabilities to increase agility and responsiveness.
The has previously praised the project’s potential for making room for future technological improvements:
The JP9102 satellites may, if they are based on open-architecture design or software-based systems, take advantage of future on-orbit servicing technologies that could extend their operational life and enhance their capabilities over time.
A budget reality
The key takeaway here is the growing gap between Australia’s defence ambitions and its budget reality. As regional tensions continue to increase and cyber threats evolve, the decision to cancel JP9102 highlights the challenging trade-offs between needing to secure Australia’s military communications and the costs of doing so.
It raises the question of how Australia will secure its military communications in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific region. The cancellation of JP9102 creates a significant capability gap in Australia’s military communications strategy that will need to be addressed.
Defence planners will likely need to explore alternative solutions. These might include partnerships with commercial satellite providers or joining the military satellite networks of allied nations, such as the United States.
