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ANDREW GREENE: Thank you, Gordon, and welcome, ladies and gentlemen, to the final session. I’m very conscious it’s been a very long day. In the case of Admiral Hammond, he began with the ABC at something like 5 am, and you’re ending at —

MARK HAMMOND: Thank you, Andrew.

ANDREW GREENE: Close to 5pm. So also with the ABC, as it turns out.

We’ve had a brief introduction to our very esteemed panel today, and there has already been quite a bit of discussion on AUKUS throughout the morning.

Today we’re ending with AUKUS meeting the Quad, particularly our very important Quad partner, Japan. So, I’d like to keep a focus on the Indo‑Pacific in this final session. And we’ll begin closest to me with Admiral Franchetti and your reflections since coming to Perth on the importance of the Indian Ocean to the United States and to the counterparts that you have here with you today.

LISA FRANCHETTI: Well, thank you, and again, it’s really an honour to be here, and I think one of the great opportunities for conferences like this is to really educate and inform all of us about the different perspectives that we share.

And I think when I reflect on the value and the importance of this region, and especially in the maritime domain to the United States, you know, I’m always reminded that we’ve always been a Pacific nation, really since after our independence. We sent our trade, our trading ships over here, you know, into this region, and we’ve always been focused on this region, and it really is our priority focus area, as put out in our ³Ô¹ÏÍøÕ¾ Defence Strategy.

I think when you look at, and you’ve heard about all of the resources, all of the challenges that we face in the region, it’s clear that no one nation can face all those challenges alone.

So, as we look to the Indo‑Pacific and we look to our partners that are working with us every single day to protect that rules‑based international order, and getting through all the other challenges that we see, from changing in climate, from illegal unregulated fishing, it’s very clear that together we can conquer a lot of those challenges, and it couldn’t be a more important region for us to be present in every day.

ANDREW GREENE: Admiral Hammond, half the world’s population lives in the Indo‑Pacific, but to this part of the Indo‑Pacific specifically, what is the importance of the Indian Ocean?

MARK HAMMOND: Oh, the Indian Ocean, well, firstly, as I said this morning, it’s foundational to the security of our island state. One third of the nation’s coastline, for an island, and the majority of the state’s coastline faces the Indian Ocean, that which doesn’t faces our northern neighbours and the vast Southern Ocean.

Around the rim of the Indian Ocean, you have 35 per cent of the world’s population, 38 coastal states, and the flow of goods and trade across the Indian Ocean fuels our economic wellbeing.

So, the Indian Ocean, just as the Pacific on the other side of our nation, is absolutely foundational to our economic wellbeing, and that which feeds our economic wellbeing underpins our national security potential.

ANDREW GREENE: Admiral Saito, welcome to Australia. I understand this is one of your first formal engagements —

AKIRA SAITO: Thank you very much.

ANDREW GREENE: — so we’re particularly pleased to have you. We’ll get your reflections on this topic too of the Indian Ocean, but more broadly the Indo‑Pacific and the importance that Japan plays in that region.

AKIRA SAITO: Hi. Thank you very much. I’m Admiral Saito, Chief of Staff, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, being appointed as [indistinct] Chief of Staff on Friday last week.

Thank you very much. I’m a newborn, only five days and 17 hours old.

First, [indistinct] navies, especially the members of AUKUS and the Quad must generate [indistinct] initiatives in the Indo‑Pacific, advancing cooperation and interoperability, logistics and technology will enable a [indistinct] response to threats against free and open oceans.

Especially, I talked about as for logistic cooperation. One of JMSDF’s recent endeavours includes enforcing Japan’s repair and the maintenance capacity for US Navy and the Royal Navy vessel.

As an example, the construction of [indistinct] engine original depot is undergoing in Japan, ensuring maintenance of this engine for US, UK, Australia, Canada and the Republic of Korea Naval vessels will be available in the coming years.

The JMSDF will continue to make every effort to strengthening the deterrence in the Indo‑Pacific region. That’s all, thank you.

ANDREW GREENE: And finally, to Admiral Key.

BEN KEY: I think the fact that we are a European nation has led to some to conclude that our interests are really only in the Euro‑Atlantic region, and that that is where some commentators believe we should double down, and the new government has been very clear that we will fulfil our obligations to NATO first and foremost.

But our economic interests are not geographically constrained in this way. As the colleagues have all said, a global economy demands global commitment and engagement from those who wish to contribute to that economy and benefit from it.

It would be bizarre, and I think wrong, if we were to assume that we left it to others to secure the maritime commons for the flow of trade and economic benefit to others whilst extracting for our own use some of the upsides.

And so, for us, noting all the statistics that we’ve heard today about the amount of value that flows across the Indian Ocean and the way it connects, and has done for centuries, if not millennia, Europe and Asia – the Indian Ocean is that conduit through which we must all come – that is why it matters to us. Because we have growing economic interests as a nation in the Indo‑Pacific region, and actually it is the Indo‑Pacific region that is driving the economic growth of the global community at the moment.

So that’s why it matters to us, and that’s why as a mariner I feel very comfortable with the deploying the Royal Navy into this region to engage with our allies and partners and play albeit a small part in securing those freedoms that matter so much upon the high seas.

ANDREW GREENE: To pick up on the theme that you’ve raised about economic security, we’re seeing that threatened as we speak every day, particularly around the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden.

To all of the panel, is this a fight that can be won quickly, easily? How do we see this challenge which has emerged in that part of the world, that links into the Indian Ocean, being resolved?

BEN KEY: I can make a start on that, and others will then have a chance to think of a more intelligent answer.

But I think what we’re seeing, both in the Southern Red Sea, in the Black Sea, and elsewhere contested waters, is actually some good doctrinal concepts about sea control, sea denial, and actually we’re digging through our doctrine books, because for a long time we have assumed that these things are available to us at no cost.

And what we’re also seeing, both from what the Ukrainians are doing in countering Russia’s illegal invasion of their sovereign land and seeking to control the Black Sea, and from in the Southern Red Sea where effectively an organisation, the Houthis, with no maritime heritage whatsoever, are different ways of trying to disrupt sea control that we wish ought to apply sea denial, which they would have.

And consequently, the way that we learn quickly to adapt our tactics and techniques, the way that we understand the risks that that represents to mariners, and therefore, also the obligations for us to protect and provide confidence and assurance, is causing us to realise what “contested” actually means.

Does this define everything that’s going to go through into the future? No, not at all. These are quite specific cases. We have to be careful, therefore, that we’re learning the right lessons, that we don’t assume that this is the future of warfare going ahead. But it has been absolutely proved in both scenarios, when pressure comes on, it can become kinetic, and kinetic means dangerous. And we have to be prepared to respond quickly, robustly and aggressively, as we have been doing in the Southern Red Sea, or as the Ukrainians, and we’ve been helping support them, in the Black Sea.

So, fascinating that to an extent it’s shaken out some of the complacency that can sometimes exist in the minds of broader communities that all of this is pretty good and the only time it gets disrupted is when a container ship gets stuck in the Suez Canal.

This is a much more significant version of that.

ANDREW GREENE: You’ve touched ‑ we’ve heard there about some of the asymmetric threats that we’re seeing in naval warfare. Admiral Franchetti, I’ll get your reflections on both the Black Sea, the Red Sea, and the various troubled spots that are currently presenting themselves.

LISA FRANCHETTI: Yep. I mean I think as Admiral Ben just said, you know, this is a critically important time for all of our navies to really understand that the freedom of the seas that we’ve enjoyed for so many years, that has really contributed significantly to global prosperity, is under threat, and we can’t take it for granted.

And so as we prepare our navies, we learn to use the capabilities we have today, we think about the capabilities we’re going to need to have in the future to be able to work together to ensure that sea control is something that is within our grasp, to ensure that we can deny the seas to those that we don’t want to use them, and that we are not caught off guard by those tactics, techniques, and procedures that you’ve mentioned; that we are able to respond. And I would say that, you know, the rules‑based international order is under threat. And, as you know, we speak with some of our commercial shipping industry colleagues, I think for them it is also a wake‑up call that they can integrate better with us and the navies around the world to make sure that we can have that free flow of commerce wherever it needs to go.

I think the other piece that’s really important, if you look at the Ukraine example, or if you look especially in the Red Sea through Operation Prosperity Guardian, is the strength of allies and partners joining together in a crisis.

And so, all the exercises we do, all this work we do together to build interoperability, it’s not just to build interoperability, but it’s to be able to have a purpose to use that when we need to. And you see that right now, with all the navies working together, whether it’s sharing information, whether it’s being able to defeat adversary capabilities, whether it’s being able to iterate inside the to‑do loop of an adversary who’s constantly changing their tactics, techniques, and procedures – these are things that we’re learning now in the Red Sea, in this conflict, in the horrific ‑ Russia’s horrific invasion of Ukraine, that have significance in every theatre in the world.

ANDREW GREENE: Admiral Hammond, Australia hasn’t deployed a warship, but we do have personnel in the Middle East. Has it been a struggle to explain to the people in this country, who have heard for years that we need to focus more on our region, to also continue to have that presence in the Middle East?

MARK HAMMOND: Yeah, thank you, Andrew. Not internally within Defence. Look, for a bit of context, we’re a navy with three destroyers, seven frigates, six submarines. My learned colleague on my right, 44 destroyers, 20 plus frigates, 24 submarines, and we all know the strength of the Royal Navy and the United States Navy, and our Indian colleague is not here, Dinesh Tripathi, unfortunately couldn’t join us, also new to the role, they have 66 warships under construction.

What the events in the Red Sea have reminded us of, frankly beyond the disruption to global trade, is the strengths we derive from the partnerships that we have.

We don’t play an Under 8s football game here and all go running off to the crisis together, ignoring the responsibilities of the neighbourhood. We actually communicate, we collaborate, and we make sure that collectively we are across the field everywhere where we need to cover. And with a very, very small navy, and in some cases one that has to reinforce our border protection responsibilities on occasion, we are best placed to provide high‑quality personnel in headquarters functions, which we have been doing for many, many years in the Red Sea.

So internally within the Department, the logic of small but effective in an environment where I’ve also got clear direction to uplift the lethality, I cannot attach new missile systems to ships at sea, they need to be in port, and I’ve got to support a recruiting challenge here in Australia, which is best done by visiting Australians in Australian ports with our warships.

So internally, no. Externally, I made the comment this morning that I would like to see maritime literacy lifted in the great nation of Australia. We have – multiple chiefs of the Australian Navy have talked about sea blindness. Our land is not girt by sea but girt by beach, and we are quick to turn our back upon the waters and gaze at the vast interior of our land.

There is more work to be done, and that’s what I’m hoping the community of practitioners here in this room can help us with. You know, let’s have honest, objective, sensible, reasonable conversations, and understand the policy environment of the day. We have clear direction to focus on the immediate region, the ³Ô¹ÏÍøÕ¾ Defence Strategy is very clear about that, the Defence Strategic Review’s been very clear about that, and the Australian Government’s been very clear about that, and we have done so with the complete support of our allies and partners.

ANDREW GREENE: I want to move on to interoperability and interchangeability between all of your navies, but for clarification, do we have some more personnel heading – some more highly‑qualified personnel, as you put it – heading to the Middle East soon?

MARK HAMMOND: Not as we speak, Andrew. There are always contributions of Australian Defence Force personnel to operations, activities, exercises around the globe. We are as a department always solicited for nominations to headquarters everywhere from United Nations in New York, the operations that they endorse and sanction, through to coalition maritime force operations in the Middle East, and other activities, even in RIMPAC, we bid for leadership positions.

We don’t necessarily fill all those positions, and ultimately something like the operations you’re talking about, that would be a consideration for Government, and if such a decision was made, then there would be announcements. But for clarity, no, not as we sit.

ANDREW GREENE: Interoperability and interchangeability. There’s been a lot of talk today of unity, unity of strength purpose. To our Japanese Naval guest, what has Japan been able to do in terms of improving interoperability with not only Quad partners but the AUKUS more broadly?

AKIRA SAITO: [Through interpreter] So, if I may talk a little bit about my experience as Commander‑in‑Chief of the Self-Defense Fleet, which was my previous position. So, we have been conducting many exercises with our ally and partners to improve our interoperability. For our Naval forces to deploy to far areas globally, it is very important for us to work together so that we’re always efficient in our deployments. We have a number of exercises that we conduct, and through those exercises we are always looking for ways to improve our interoperability. I can give you some examples, such as Malabar, and also RIMPAC, which was recently conducted, and really gives us opportunities for much improvement. So, the US Navy is one of the – has become a hub of these exercises, and we conduct very high tactical exercises throughout our deployment. And the four navies here, we are always sharing the – our plans for deployment, and we always look for opportunities to improve our interoperability.

ANDREW GREENE: To our British guest?

BEN KEY: So, I think we need to recognise that in that kind of – the way that we see the allies, the partnerships evolving, interchangeability really is the headmark that we should be working towards.

To be interoperable means that we have the confidence, but we each play our own parts. Interchangeable means that we can play each other’s parts. And we’re exploring that, I think, with quite a lot of courage, both in terms of what we’re wanting to achieve, but also some of the policy barriers that are being removed from the traditional way of doing business, kind of late 20th century, in order to open up those.

And I would give an example, in 2021, when in the Western Pacific our four navies gathered together for a major exercise involving carriers from three of our countries – and I’m sure, Mark, Australia will get carrier capability back in due course. Sorry. I’ve got to get him back from earlier comments.

MARK HAMMOND: It’s not a bad idea.

BEN KEY: But actually, what was really significant about that was on board the British carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, was a US Marine Corps squadron, and it wasn’t just visiting for a couple of days, it was on board for seven and a half months. And the work and effort that went into achieving that so that we could embark US weapons on to a UK aircraft carrier, so that the pilots from the two nations could freely share at times highly classified information concerning the way that we operate the F‑35B, and that we have complete confidence that it didn’t matter who was airborne doing what, the instruction sets that could be used were exactly the same and understood by all, and by all the escorts that were in the group.

To achieve that, and then cement it, not as a one‑off, but this is now the new norm and we’re building on, took courage, took a huge amount of work from policymakers and others to support, that actually unlocked that sense of what maritime forces need to be able to do in the 21st century. And I look forward with great excitement, next year with the next UK carrier deployment into the region, to being able to build on that, and to demonstrate, therefore, that we are increasingly comfortable doing our business in each other’s minds and not just that photograph that shows that, as Admiral Franchetti described earlier, we can steam in formation.

It’s that confidence and trust that I think underpins interchangeability, and that is going to be desperately important in putting across the kind of deterrence messages that matter to us.

ANDREW GREENE: Admiral Hammond, you noted that you’re the smallest navy represented here, but what has been the Australian experience of trying to generate interoperability?

MARK HAMMOND: And for those who are wondering, that’s why I’m the only three-star up here. Very small navy.

Interchangeability in my mind, I agree with Ben’s point that it’s different to interoperable. It is the ability to play each other’s part or to be in the same act at the same time in the same pressure hull as a submariner getting the job done.

The key enabler for interchangeability for us, and I’d say that the greatest interchangeability we’ve got in the Royal Australian Navy is probably, firstly with US Submarine Force where our COs graduate from the US Submarine Commanding Officers Course, we operate a common combat system, we deploy the common torpedo. It’s one of the advantages of the AUKUS program is we will end up with three navies operating a similar submarine with a common baseline with consistent combat system capability.

So that enables us to bring US sonar operators on board our submarines, for our junior officers to go and deploy on fast attack submarines in the South China Sea, and we’ve been doing that long before AUKUS. This is a decades‑old journey of interchangeability.

In the Surface Fleet, the Aegis combat system has enabled a similar degree of connective tissue. So, for industry out there, commonality of key systems, like combat systems, is absolutely a capability enhancer for us. It has a disproportional impact on our ability to fight and win together.

And as we look to expand our interoperability and interchangeability with partners, that’s what we’re looking at with both Japan, with India, with South Korea, with Indonesia, we’re looking to enable the greatest degree of interoperability, and in exquisite cases, wherever we can, that interchangeability.

And what do we gain from that? You gain trust. Ben made the point today that a trusted neighbour is a good neighbour, a trusted partner is a good partner. And back to the Red Sea, I don’t need to be in the Red Sea to learn the lessons of maritime warfare in the Red Sea. They are being – there’s positive flow of information here, positive connectivity into our Maritime Warfare Centre, we’ve got all the modelling, all the hard data, all the information we need to understand whether or not our systems and our weapons are up to scratch.

So, if the US fires one of their missiles in the Red Sea, that’s pertinent to us because we use the same missile systems. So we derive all these intangible benefits from that degree of interchangeability, quite often without being in the room on the other side of the planet.

ANDREW GREENE: But would we learn more if we were in the Red Sea?

MARK HAMMOND: Depends on what would we not be learning if we weren’t in the South China Sea. You know, we have an obligation, a responsibility to provide a reassuring presence in a number of different locations.

Sure, it’s great to have a flag on a ship four and a half thousand miles away. Do I want to push a 25‑year‑old frigate all the way over there and back again? It’s a month each way, and we only have exquisite choices to make. I’ve got destroyers to fit with brand new missiles, I’ve got test firings to complete, we’ve got presence missions in the South China Sea, we’ve got border protection duties, and one or two destroyers out of a force of 44, that’s an easy decision to make. One or two destroyers out of a force of three, very different proposition.

So the key takeaway here is, could we be in the South China Sea from a capability perspective? Absolutely. Should we? Decision for Government. Do we need a bigger navy? That’s what the Surface Combatant Review said, that’s what we’re getting after.

ANDREW GREENE: Admiral Franchetti.

LISA FRANCHETTI: Yeah. So, I would just like to add a few things to build on what my colleagues have already said. First, I think it is important to recognise that every navy can make a contribution.

You know, there are global challenges that really no matter the size of the navy or the capabilities of the navy, it’s a maritime link in the chain; everyone is a link in that.

So, as we build towards high‑end interoperability with some partners, other partners we build HADR capabilities, so it’s important to recognise that there are significant contributions that every navy all around the globe has an opportunity to make.

So, I shouldn’t lose it always on interchangeability and interoperability. That’s very important, and we should all work towards that, while recognising that some other Navies will make this contribution which is complementary to the capabilities that we already have.

I think the other one is just the importance of the exercises that we do. You know, we plan hard, all of us, to be able to achieve the objectives of each nation when we plan our exercises, and so when we do Rim of the Pacific, which is underway right now with 29 nations, seven of them are from Europe, and many, many ships, many, many aircraft, but even equally important are the number of people that are participating on the planning staffs.

You know, we fight in a war‑fighting ecosystem. That’s very important that we have great platforms, great capabilities, but our people need to know how to plan, how to execute missions, and by having members on a staff, whether it’s in the Middle East or whether it’s in RIMPAC, all of those officers are learning, all of those enlisted warriors are also learning, and the more that we can grow those capabilities both at sea and in our headquarters, in our maritime operation centres, the more options we’ll be able to provide for our nation’s decision makers going forward.

So, I think that’s a really important part of interchangeability, is the ability of those staffs to synchronise. We have leaders, each nation here leads many parts of their Combined Maritime Force, or they lead RIMPAC, and having those experiences will help us be much better in the future.

ANDREW GREENE: Admiral Saito raised Exercise Malabar. I’d be curious to learn from you, Admiral Hammond what we’re learning from Exercise Malabar, and you know, it does involve very different sized navies.

MARK HAMMOND: Thank you, Andrew. I think this has become very quickly one of our most important exercises, because of those shared interests at sea which stretch from the Indian Ocean all the way through the arc to the north of Japan.

Each of our nations have an important role to play, and it’s like that, the fable I was quoting this morning in my speech, you know, when we stand apart, we’re easier to be broken or defeated, but when we stand together, it’s a significant maritime force. Again, 66 warships under construction in the Indian Navy, 44 destroyers, 22 frigates, 24 submarines over here, the small contribution the Royal Australian Navy makes at the moment, which will only grow in the future, and the United States Seventh Fleet, one of the most storied war‑fighting navies in the world.

When you combine all of those forces, that’s a powerful deterrent, you know, there aren’t many people who would want to take that force on.

So, we derive a significant national deterrence advantage from us strengthening those relationships and the interoperability at sea.

We also learn about new ways of doing business. Each of our navies have particular strengths, and we come at solving problems sometimes from different angles, and when you put your people on somebody else’s ships or submarines or aircraft, or you embed them in other teams, they come back with new ideas, new ways of doing things.

So that enables you to accelerate learning opportunities, to integrate them into your organisation, to leverage initiatives and original thoughts that otherwise you wouldn’t have access to, and then gradually over time optimise your own capabilities.

And the people‑to‑people aspects are really, really important as well. When you look at our university environment here in Australia, we have a lot of Japanese expats, we have a lot of Indian expats, we’re increasingly seeing a lot of American expats, and arguably the British expat community is also one of the largest.

So over time, you’re building connective tissue. When an Indian ship comes into Sydney Harbour, have you seen the diaspora that turns out for ship visits? You know, I wish our ships got that much love on a port visit in Australia. It’s incredible, and it’s an incredible reminder of the people‑to‑people links that navies facilitate.

So, I could go on and on. I think Malabar is an important platform. The ability to host it in Sydney Harbour last year was a highlight of my career, and Akira was there with us representing the Japanese Navy in Sydney. But I think it’s foundational for our future national security.

ANDREW GREENE: We are approaching the end stage of this panel, and the day’s proceedings. A couple of you have touched on workforce. Workforce is going to be a huge challenge for each of the countries represented here. To Admiral Saito, some very ambitious targets in your country for building up Defence Industry. How is Japan going to find the manpower?

AKIRA SAITO: [Through interpreter] It is already a big challenge for us to secure the workforce that is necessary. With the decreasing population and lack of the workforce, it will be necessary for us to design and procure systems that will require less people or automisation.

So that is one of the reasons why I was very much looking forward to taking part in the IODS, the exhibition here. I will be in the exhibition hall, please stop me if you have any assets that will help us use less manning for our ‑ for the JMSDF.

ANDREW GREENE: To the First Sea Lord, atomisation and that sort of thing, is that something that the UK is looking at?

BEN KEY: Yeah, absolutely. And actually, if we weren’t looking to use modern technology, I think the young men and women that we’re inviting to join the navy would quickly become disinterested in it, because we are, you know, navies, whatever their size, are by their very nature technical organisations, and so the people that join to serve and wear our uniforms are expecting to operate in something that is modern, forward‑facing and cutting edge.

And so, to provide stimulating careers for them, we need to be in that space, and clearly there is a lot, and no doubt, as Admiral Saito says, you know, we could wander round the exhibition hall here, and a lot of people are going to sell us a lot of autonomous stuff, or at least try to, and tell us that this is the future of maritime warfare.

I’m not completely persuaded of that. I think autonomy has a huge role to play, and why would you endanger life if you don’t need to. But fundamentally, fighting, whether at sea or on land, is something that is resolved in the minds of people, and that does require, if it comes to that, a form of risk and violence, and not all things can be done autonomously.

And so, what we’re looking to find is the balance both in terms of on board and reducing numbers in the crew, but also maximising the concept of mass in order to achieve the effects that we want to achieve. And there is a sweet spot ‑ I don’t ‑ I think it’s a dynamic thing, you’ll never know when you’re completely in it, and we also need to be honest that not everything can reduce crews all the way down, because whilst you might, and the US have experimented with this, I know, I’m sure the rest of us have got programs, if you take a ship’s crew all the way down to 15, 16, 17, because it gives you that perfect moment, when things then start to go wrong, you certainly run out of people, and 17 people from a ship can’t really contribute much to a humanitarian disaster relief activity.

It’s very difficult out of a ship’s company of 17 to create a boarding team that can go on board and intercept illegal fishing, or deal with counter‑narcotics.

And so, there’s a number of activities that do require human beings to be involved. And the question for us, as we think about these future fleets, is what is that balance that allows us to achieve the things we need to achieve in the most effective manner, embracing technology, but also recognising that there will be workforce involvement. But providing that is stimulating and interesting, then I’m confident that we can persuade people to join, and more importantly retain them as they build their skills.

ANDREW GREENE: And to you, Admiral Franchetti.

LISA FRANCHETTI: I just want to build on that a little bit about the uncrewed or autonomous. I think this does offer a lot of good opportunity for further cooperation between our navies, because every navy is looking at the same challenges in terms of workforce, in terms of increasing responsibilities, increasing global areas of operation, and I think this is a place where the technology is new enough, that together we can look at what are the problems we’re trying to solve with the technology, we can throw that out into industry where there’s amazing creativity, a lot of innovative spirit, and then we can start getting some of these best‑of‑breed solutions, and we can work together then to work through the tactics, techniques, procedures.

How are we going to work together with them? I like to say that we can use some of these technologies to do things that are dangerous, dull and dirty, and then we can free up our sailors to do the things that they really want to do.

You know, we just created a robotics rating earlier this year, and it’s generated a lot of excitement in the people that want to join our team, because just like Ben said, people want to be part of winning teams, but also teams with the best technology that they can use and get that into their hands.

So, we’re very focused on the workforce, we’re very focused on how do we integrate unmanned, uncrewed, autonomous technology, and again, let that unleash the power of our sailors every single day.

ANDREW GREENE: And Admiral Hammond, we’ve begun this journey this year with the Surface Fleet Review talking about optimally crewed vessels, what’s briefly the experience so far?

MARK HAMMOND: I think the ‑ so the large optimally crewed surface vessel is a program in the hands of the United States Navy, which we are tracking quite closely. I will not eat Lisa’s luncheon that, if she would care to make a comment on that program, I’ll leave that to her.

What I would say is one of our colleagues here, Japan, has done an exceptional job of leveraging emerging technology to reduce the crew size of their frigates, and when you look at all four candidates that are under consideration under Sea 3000 for the general purpose frigate program, we’re looking at a crew, base crews of 90 to 100, you throw the helicopter team on board, you’re up to about 120. Anzac crew, about 180. Go put it in the Red Sea, 200, 220.

You know, we can replace the Anzac crews, the Anzac ships with 11 general purpose frigates without increasing the crewing liability for the Royal Australian Navy. That is the promise of technology.

There are different ways of doing business, different ways of driving ships, reducing the crew footprint, which we are learning more about through the Sea 3000 process, and concurrently we’ve had Autonomous Warrior underway now for many, many years. We are fielding in water uncrewed capabilities at an ever‑increasing rate, and some of those uncrewed surface vessels, for example, are already in the field in maritime border protection duties at the moment, for example, and that in itself, will hopefully one day ‑ and I saw Admiral Sonter in the audience early today ‑ hopefully commander ‑ Maritime Border Command can reduce the demand signal for on‑water crewed surface vessels as we prove the value of autonomy.

So, it is a key part of the future, it’s a key capability we are getting after at speed now, and it is going to free up our people for our less dangerous, less dull and more important missions.

And the last point on that, I would say mine warfare is one of those where we’re particularly focused. Do I want to put a clearance diver with a small‑shaped charge on the seabed to deal with a problem? Not particularly. There are other ways of doing these things without putting our people in harm’s way, and that’s what we’re all about up here.

ANDREW GREENE: I did say we’d steer away from AUKUS, because that has been covered at length today, but while we do have the First Sea Lord and the US Chief of Naval Operations, can you give the audience an idea of what Australia is getting from the rather large financial contributions Australia is making to both your industrial bases, and why is that important?

LISA FRANCHETTI: Well, I think it’s really important, because all the things we’ve been talking about all day is really the security and stability, you know, of this region today, and far into the future.

And the promise of AUKUS, and really all of our relationships is that we’re able to bring together the capabilities, the industrial bases, the innovative bases really of our nations, so we can move together, faster, further than we really could alone.

So as many of the speakers here today said, this is a once in a generation strategic advancement that is going to pay off in terms of security and stability, from a deterrence perspective, and from the ability to respond in a crisis or win decisively in any type of conflict.

ANDREW GREENE: And Admiral Key.

BEN KEY: I would just look at the long‑term investment that Australia is making, the Commonwealth is making in the United Kingdom. It is going to return to the Commonwealth of Australia’s benefit through the development of the transition that the Royal Australian Navy is making in its Submarine Force in moving from were conventional to nuclear propulsion.

And that needs to be catalysed from somewhere, and the choice for Australia was either to do it from a standing start all on its own, or to leverage what the United States and the United Kingdom is already doing in order to help Australia then achieve its own capabilities.

And as Admiral Mark observed earlier today, the reactor itself is not going to be built here in Australia. So, it’s not unreasonable to expect and ask Australia to make some of the upfront investment that allows the United Kingdom to then build the reactor house. Similar going on in the US.

But this returns back, and then think of the opportunity the other way, that for us in the United Kingdom, you’ve then got a nuclear submarine operating capability here in Australia that is of benefit to us in the long run as well, and I know Australians; they’re warm, welcoming, decent, but not always entirely generous people. I am sure that there will be a point in the future when we will be asked to put our hand into our pocket, but that will be for our benefit as well.

So, I’m kind of comfortable with what’s going through ‑ there’s a lot of work going on across the three capitals to look at the balance of the AUKUS payments to make sure that they’re appropriate, that they’re equitable, and all of it is focused on long‑term benefit for all three in this cases that are involved in the Pillar 1 activity.

ANDREW GREENE: Did you want to add to that, maybe ‑‑

MARK HAMMOND: I wondered where he was going with that comment for a moment there. Landed okay. You’ll get the bill later.

But just a case in point, the Rolls‑Royce production line for Naval nuclear reactors is designed to meet the production requirement for the Royal Navy Submarine Force, both their fast attack and strategic deterrent capability.

If you want to add a bunch of Australian submarines, they need another production line. It’s only appropriate that we contribute funds to get that production line up and running as quickly as possible, ’cause that’s one of the critical long‑lead items.

So that’s the kind of contribution, and in the case of the United States, their industrial landscape as a result of 70 years of sovereign investment, that in itself has a price, you know, they are ‑ our contribution is a fraction, a tiny fraction of what it has cost the United States taxpayers over 70 years to establish.

So, call it an entry fee, call it a reasonable contribution, call it a strategic investment, in the grand context of what we are actually going to receive at the end of this program, and what we’re already receiving in terms of intellectual property without a fee, I think it’s a reasonable contribution. It’s one of those contributions to the national investment in our insurance plan at a time where the risks from an insurance perspective are increasing. So, from a premium perspective it kind of makes sense to me, but I’m no economist.

ANDREW GREENE: And Admiral Franchetti, just briefly, is it going to get us to the desired number of Virginia‑class boats off the production line?

LISA FRANCHETTI: Yeah, this has been a very big focus, you know, for me personally, and for our Secretary. We’re making significant investments on the United States side. We’ve already talked about the workforce, but it’s also investing in the supply chain, the industrial base plant, equipment, all of the things that we need to do to be able to accelerate the productions of the Virginias, and I’m confident working together with industry and working together with all of our different work flow production resources, such as community colleges, really investing in STEM earlier on to grow the workforce that we need in the future, that all of these investments that we’re making are really going to pay off, and they’re going to accelerate the delivery of our Virginia‑class submarines, and I look forward to that and continuing to work for and to meet all of our AUKUS objectives that we’ve agreed to.

ANDREW GREENE: And given that we woke Admiral Hammond, I think, first thing in the morning, I did promise he would get the last word today.

To wrap out the session, I hand the floor to you, Chief, for something you want to say.

MARK HAMMOND: Thanks, Andrew. There’s a couple of things I’d like to say. Firstly, thank you to my colleagues for coming all this way ‑ Lisa from the ‑ is geographically speaking the furthest point away from Washington DC, and it’s her first visit to Perth, I hope it was worth the trip so far.

LISA FRANCHETTI: Great.

MARK HAMMOND: Ben, it’s only three weeks ago that we were together in London, and where you were Second Sea Lord in Portsmouth, great to see you again, and thanks for coming again, and it was Ben’s 30th wedding anniversary yesterday. That shows you how committed he is to the program.

And Akira, we were together last week in Yokosuka, it’s great to see you again, and thanks for choosing Australia as your first overseas destination.

Last week we fired our first successful Naval strike missile at Exercise RIMPAC. From decision to invest in this capability to test firing, that period represents the fastest introduction into service of long‑range missile capability in our Navy today.

That stems from interchangeability, interoperability partnership between our two Navies, with industry, within Defence between Navy Shipbuilding Sustainment Group, our GWEO organisation, that is what teamwork and interoperability and focus looks like, and that is the first of several that we have in the wings.

The Royal Australian Navy, though small, is increasing in its lethality. That is one example. I look forward to the revelation of others in the future.

Finally, the dialogue around Australian Navy capability has quite often been helped by journalists and novelists, and the most recent contribution is by Mike Carlton who’s become the unofficial historian of the Royal Australian Navy.

Mike’s latest book is Dive! It’s the history of Australian submariners at war. It begins with the history of the submarine, and it talks about incredible achievements of our submariners over many, many years. I get no royalties. I hear it’s got a cracking foreword. That’s what I’m told, and not just by family, but it’s available for pre‑order now, and it’s out on 6 August, just in time for Father’s Day. I highly recommend it.

Let’s get the message of the incredible capabilities of the Australian Submarine Force achieved over 100 years, let’s elevate that, and, Andrew, I expect you to tweet that, ’cause you have 26,000 followers or something like that.

People will not want to join something they don’t understand. It’s time for the silent service to go loud, and this is the first step. Thank you.

MARK HAMMOND: Thank you. Thank you, Lisa.

ANDREW GREENE: After hearing Admiral Hammond say something nice about a journalist, I will end the session there. Please, ladies and gentlemen, thank our very esteemed panel.