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On March 14, the ³Ô¹ÏÍøÕ¾ Archives of Australia (NAA) released documents from the Howard Government’s ³Ô¹ÏÍøÕ¾ Security Committee (NSC) of cabinet. They all relate to Australia’s entry into the Iraq War in 2003.

This tranche goes beyond the archive’s release of a selection of the records of full cabinet on January 1 2024.

So what do they tell us about the decision to send Australia to war?

What was the ³Ô¹ÏÍøÕ¾ Security Committee?

Australian cabinets have usually been assisted by standing and ad hoc committees. The NSC was the peak decision-making body for national security and major foreign policy matters during the Howard government (1996 to 2007).

Its meetings were attended by relevant ministers and senior officials. These officials included the heads of the departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and Defence, the Chief of the Defence Force and the head of the Office of ³Ô¹ÏÍøÕ¾ Assessments. Unlike other cabinet committees, decisions of the NSC did not require the endorsement of the cabinet itself.

In the release of cabinet records from 2003, discussion of Iraq was scant. This made clear that a full appreciation of the work of a federal cabinet requires including the documents and records of important cabinet committees.

For the Howard government, that was the NSC. Future releases of cabinet records from Kevin Rudd’s government might need to include the Strategic Priorities Budget Committee (SPBC) or “Gang of Four”.

The release of 2003 cabinet records in January 2024 was followed by a concerted media campaign for the full release of government records on Iraq. The prime minister intervened, ordering a review conducted by former senior public servant, Dennis Richardson. One of the review’s key recommendations concerned the ³Ô¹ÏÍøÕ¾ Archives. This was that its yearly proactive release of cabinet records those of the NSC.

What do the 2003 NSC documents tell us?

The NSC records reveal planning for Australian military involvement in Iraq was under way well before the formal cabinet decision to join President George W. Bush’s “coalition of the willing” on March 18 2003. For some historians, this will confirm to join the war at least as early as 2002.

In a record of a meeting on January 10 2003, the minister for defence, Robert Hill, and the defence force chief noted that some deployment of Australian Defence Force (ADF) units would be necessary within a month to meet indicative planning from US Central Command “on the likely time-frame for possible military action against Iraq”.

At the same meeting, the NSC agreed to approve specific forward deployments of ADF units from a list the committee had previously agreed on August 26 and December 4 2002. These ADF units were admittedly not to engage in any military action against Iraq unless the government expressly authorised it. But the reference to decisions to forward deploy the ADF in 2002 points to the necessity for these records to be made public.

In the meeting on January 10, Howard made clear any Australian decision formally to commit the ADF in Iraq would be referred to the full cabinet. He also noted he had “foreshadowed to the governor-general the general direction of steps under consideration by the government in relation to Iraq”.

These steps, we know, did not include Howard’s originally planned reference of the Iraq matter to the governor-general via the executive council. The decision not to do so was probably because the governor-general, Peter Hollingworth, had on the war from the attorney-general.

Howard later advised Hollingworth that reference of the Iraq decision to the governor-general was unnecessary, and the ADF could be deployed under section 8 of the Defence Act.

Another of the NSC files includes the minute of March 18 2003, containing full cabinet’s authorisation of military action in Iraq. The full cabinet file had nothing else. The NSC file includes a submission from Hill, “circulated in the cabinet room on 17 and 18 March” seeking cabinet agreement on a national policy for possible military operations in Iraq.

Hill’s submission indicated that before the Australian government had received a formal request for support for Coalition operations, it had authorised the ADF to conduct “prudent contingency planning” for a range of capabilities in Iraq. US targeting strategy, Hill reported, included supporting “regime change” along with incapacitating Iraq’s “delivery of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)”.

This document illustrates the tensions between Australian and US war aims in Iraq. The paramount US objective was regime change. Australian policy was not to foster regime change, “although the Government has recognised this may be a desirable, even inevitable, outcome of military action”.

The file also includes the “memorandum of advice” constituting the legal justification for Australian participation in Iraq. The advice was authored not by the solicitor-general but by first assistant secretaries in DFAT and the Attorney-General’s Department.

When published, the memorandum was sharply criticised by legal scholars and former solicitor-general . The later release of departmental documents will permit us to see what other legal opinions on the war were held in the two departments.

Now we need to know more

The proactive digitisation of NSC documents on Iraq is a welcome development for which the ³Ô¹ÏÍøÕ¾ Archives should be congratulated. It should be commended, too, for foreshadowing the release of other NSC records from 2003.

However, fuller understanding of how and why Australia went to war in Iraq requires the release of NSC documents from 2002 and 2001.

David Lee was the ³Ô¹ÏÍøÕ¾ Archives of Australia’s cabinet historian for the releases of records from 2002 and 2003 and is a member of Australian s for War Powers Reform.